After November Sixth
Europe & transatlantic alliance deterrence wargame
- Turns
- 6
- Pace
- Self-paced
- Scored on
- Problem Framing
- Decision Effectiveness
- Risk Management
- Strategic Cohesiveness
- Context Management
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Overview
Mid-November 2026. A US decision to remove roughly 30,000 personnel from Europe over 24 months forces NATO to redesign its Force Model before Russia may regain the ability to conduct a limited Baltic operation. As DSACEUR, you hold the pen on SHAPE's sourcing plan: what Europe fields first, where it is based, what remains dependent on Washington, and which risks ministers must knowingly carry.
SHAPE and NATO political-military meetings from November 2026 through March 2028, against a four-month-old Ukraine ceasefire and an accelerating force-generation contest.
Your seat
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
NATO
The European four-star who holds the pen on SHAPE's revised Force Model sourcing plan by delegation from SACEUR. DSACEUR can set military requirements, sequence sourcing asks, and recommend readiness, capability, dependency, and geographic priorities to the Military Committee, but cannot compel national funding, procurement, or hosting decisions.
Your history
The role inherits the November 6, 2026 posture recommendation and must convert a US national decision into a militarily coherent allied plan.
Your brief
Objectives
Cover the most consequential gaps High priority
Prioritize the mass, enabler, logistics, naval, and mobility shortfalls that most affect deterrence inside the Russian window.
Secure high-end enablers Medium priority
NATO access to strategic ISR, tanker hours, SEAD, long-range fires, integrated air and missile defense, combat aircraft, and naval presence.
Preserve allied consent Low priority
Distribute geographic, fiscal, and dependency risks in a form the Military Committee and North Atlantic Council can sustain.
Capabilities
Authority to direct SHAPE planning, define military requirements, compare national offers, test operational dependencies, and recommend a Force Model sourcing plan.
Resources
SHAPE planning staffs, national capability-target returns, allied intelligence, SACEUR's delegation, Military Committee access, and the 90-day planning process.
Constraints
DSACEUR cannot compel appropriations, procurement, permanent basing, or national force commitments. The 3.5% core-defense path, the 76,000-personnel floor Congress wrote into the National Defense Authorization Act, host-nation consent, and the North Atlantic Council's consensus practice shape what can be delivered.
Actors
Russia
ActiveState actor
Reconstituting forces assessed by allied intelligence as potentially ready for a limited Baltic operation in 18–30 months.
Allied planning treats the post-ceasefire reconstitution clock, rather than declared Russian intent, as the binding military deadline.
Germany
EngagedState actor
National forces, host-nation infrastructure, defense funding, and influence over NATO force sourcing.
Germany has carried major elements of the US European posture that the November 6, 2026 recommendation now removes.
Poland
ActiveState actor
National forces, eastern host-nation infrastructure, force-generation capacity, and defense funding.
Poland has consistently favored forward presence over reinforcement plans that mature after the assessed Russian window.
Estonia
ActiveState actor
A high defense-spending commitment, Baltic political influence, host-nation infrastructure, and national forces designed for territorial defense.
Estonia invokes Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 as a demand for credible defense planning, while recognizing that the treaty does not prescribe a particular formation or stationing model.
France
EngagedState actor
Nuclear forces and European high-end capabilities relevant to ISR, combat aviation, suppression of enemy air defenses, long-range fires, and naval presence.
France has paired support for European responsibility with opposition to dependency on US industrial capacity.
Spain
EngagedState actor
National forces, air and naval infrastructure, defense funding, and influence over NATO force sourcing.
The November 6, 2026 recommendation places Spanish air and naval planning directly inside the Force Model revision.
United States
ActiveState actor
Forward ground, air, and naval forces; rotational forces; nuclear forces; strategic ISR; and some long-range fires.
The Pentagon delivered its Europe posture recommendation on November 6, 2026, establishing the timetable against which SHAPE must redesign the Force Model.
How this scenario is scored
Escalation ladder
Alliance-Russia Force-Generation Pressure
Tracks how closely Russian reconstitution, US departures, allied readiness gaps, and political disputes are converging.
- Routine planning
- Manageable shortfall
- Visible strain
- Competing clocks Starts here
- Window narrowing
- Acute exposure
- Deterrence at immediate risk
1 is calm · 7 is most escalated
World dimensions
Critical Force-Model Coverage Starts 3 / 5
The extent to which NATO has credible, timely coverage for the mass, logistics, mobility, sustainment, naval, and other priority shortfalls that most affect deterrence during the Russian readiness window.
High-End Enabler Capacity Starts 2 / 5
NATO's assured access to strategic ISR, tanker hours, SEAD, long-range fires, integrated air and missile defense, combat aircraft, and naval presence.
Alliance Cohesion Starts 3 / 5
The willingness of exposed, hosting, producing, and slower-spending allies to sustain a common sourcing plan through the Military Committee and North Atlantic Council.
Every WarPaths game is scored on the same five criteria; how strategic judgment is scored explains each one.